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Abstract:  “Compassionate migration” carries social significance and implies moral criteria. This 
practical notion should provide means to review, envision, and develop laws, policies, and practices for 
how we engage noncitizens and build political community within wider human relations. Yet 
“compassion” is an elastic concept; competing discourses and practices reveal conflicting meanings, 
assumptions, and orientations. “Compassionate migration” needs criteria upon which its “compassion” is 
evaluated, including how this notion evolves and what practical results it inspires—such as social 
cohesion, immigrant integration, strengthened community, and societal transformation. Bookending the 
chapter’s conceptually driven discussion are two recent, and opposite, case studies in the American 
immigration debate: Donald Trump’s odd rhetoric of “compassion” and Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s 
normative shift from a locus of “enmification” toward a community of “Thanksmas.” 
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The phrase “compassionate migration” carries social significance and implies moral criteria. This notion 
should provide means of reviewing, envisioning, and developing laws, policies, and practices for how we 
engage noncitizens and build political community within wider human relations. Yet “compassion” is an 
elastic concept not reducible to a single definition and competing discourses and practices in its name 
reveal conflicting meanings, assumptions, and orientations. Those wishing to shape the meaning of 
“compassionate migration” must navigate these dynamics to form consensus. Furthermore, 
“compassionate migration” needs criteria upon which it too is evaluated, including how the notion 
evolves and what practical results it produces or inspires, such as social cohesion, immigrant integration, 
strengthened community, and societal transformation. This chapter, which draws chiefly from moral 
psychology, social/political philosophy, conflict resolution, and hate studies, highlights these issues in 
service of meeting those aims. Bookending a conceptually driven discussion are two recent case studies in 
the immigration debate—Donald Trump’s odd rhetoric of “compassion” and Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s 
normative shift from a locus of “enmification” toward a community of “Thanksmas.” 
 
Compassion and Enmification 
 
In a presidential campaign noteworthy for surreal moments (Kirk et al. 2016), one of the more noteworthy 
came during Ivanka Trump’s speech at the 2016 Republican National Convention, when she touted her 
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father’s “kindness and compassion” (Trump 2016b). What made it surreal, at least for many critics of the 
future president-elect, is that throughout his campaign Donald Trump drew condemnation for making 
offensive statements suggestive of a narcissist, authoritarian, misogynist, racist, nativist, nationalist, 
xenophobe, protectionist, cynic, demagogue, huckster, and provocateur. For example, during the speech 
in which he announced his candidacy, Trump referred to Mexican immigrants as “rapists” (Trump 2015). 
A rhetoric of fearmongering and chauvinistic stereotyping ensued, as he called repeatedly for a closed, 
securitized society fortified by robust immigration enforcement. Trump promised mass deportation of 
unauthorized migrants (Passel and Cohn 2016)1 and a border wall to keep out “the bad ones” from 
Mexico and elsewhere. His oft-repeated “illegal immigration” punch lines slandered millions of people as 
deviants, violent criminals, job thieves, and general drains on communities, public coffers, and the 
country. Trump also derided opponent Hillary Clinton’s promise of comprehensive immigration reform as 
“radical and dangerous,” involving “mass amnesty, mass immigration, and mass lawlessness,” and 
“uncontrolled immigration” (Trump 2016a). In other words, Trump displayed great skill in enmification.2 
Whither compassion? 
 
A closer review of Trump’s campaign rhetoric reveals that he sought to seize the term “compassionate” 
and apply a politico-legal notion of “compassion” to some of his positions. Trump self-described as the 
“candidate of compassion” and labeled his stance on health care reform and some other policies as 
“compassionate.” During his Presidential nomination acceptance speech, he again reached for this 
rhetoric, presenting a veneer of something universal in scope yet sliding in scale according to citizenship 
status and calibrated by law enforcement: 
 
On January 21st of 2017, the day after I take the oath of office, Americans will finally 
wake up in a country where the laws of the United States are enforced. We are going to 
be considerate and compassionate to everyone. But my greatest compassion will be for 
our own struggling citizens (Trump 2016a). 
 
Trump later appeared, briefly, to soften this stance when meeting with a group of GOP-supporting 
Latina/os who want immigration reform based in “compassion” (Gamboa 2016), but a few days later his 
unreformed ideas drew disappointed reaction. Jacob Monty, a Houston-based Latino attorney whose firm 
specializes in immigration compliance for businesses and industries with large Hispanic workforces, 
called the plan “not realistic and not compassionate” (Lockhart 2016). 
 
Ultimately, what “compassion” means to Donald Trump is a moot question: it is futile to speculate on the 
contents of a consistently inconsistent person’s head and heart, let alone try to determine what 
relationship may exist among his beliefs, speech, and conduct. Even now, after his unexpected Election 
Day victory, none of us knows what the “Trump moment” means, let alone what is behind his anti-
Latina/o, anti-Mexican, and anti-immigrant invective3 and (or) his self-styled rhetoric of “compassion.” 
Conversely, it is easy to imagine why Trump would want to claim the mantle of “compassion” alongside 
that of “law-and-order.” “Compassion” is a clarion call for many longtime “compassionate 
conservatives”4 and other political influences whom Trump needed to court (Beinart 2014), and cursory 
reviews of political history, science, and strategizing may reveal other self-interested reasons.5 
 
Compassion: An Elastic Concept 
 
Even if none of these rationales should happen to describe Trump’s mindset, ample reason exists to 
support a weak claim that he is mistaken about the nature and function of compassion, and perhaps a 
stronger one about whether his immigration stance is “compassionate.” Yet this chapter steps away from 
headline-fueled debates. There is a more interesting matter to explore here for those concerned with 
advancing “compassionate migration,” as raised by this example: compassion is an elastic concept with 
multiple meanings, manifestations, and applications in a wide array of discourses and contexts. 
 
Political campaigns, policy debates, and community conversations often feature competing notions of 
compassion, not just competing uses of the same word. For want of better (or any) analytical descriptions 
and normative criteria, these situations can bog down in (or never rise above) finger-pointing, kneejerk 
reaction, emotivism, crass branding strategies, talking past each other, unarticulated assumptions, and the 
like. Those interested in the notion of “compassionate migration” should anticipate such dynamics and 
attempt to address them forthrightly. The scope and substance of immigration reform, especially 
regarding unauthorized migrants, remain complicated and contentious even as millions of people (most of 
whom are women and children) face the hostilities and dire conditions described in this volume. The 
reforms of law, policy, and practice that “compassionate migration” requires will involve consensus 
building and effective organizing. 
 
Beyond serving prudential concerns, intellectual honesty requires acknowledging the conceptual elasticity 
of compassion, and this may mean proceeding without rigid definitions, principles, and standards of 
“compassionate migration” too. The latter notion begs semiotic and existential questions as to the 
meaning of the former, none of which will be settled through inflexible assertions. No one has exclusive 
control over the concept of compassion, its content, and practices in its name or as motivated by it. The 
same will hold true for “compassionate migration” because it seeks to be an open-source, crowdsourced, 
normative social movement, not a political slogan or private brand. This volume would be remiss without 
acknowledging and opening inquiry on conceptual complexities, contested meanings, definitional 
disputes, as well as political wrangling and practical challenges.  
 
So, this chapter opens several such inquiries: what relation compassion has to positive law and 
jurisprudence6 in general, and to immigration law and policy specifically; how various limitations (such 
as logistics and “compassion fatigue”) might affect compassionate action; how to address sociocultural or 
attitudinal variances in compassion orientations; whether (and, if so, how) to craft alliances with 
organizations that tout “compassionate migration” yet have produced human misery in other contexts; 
whether compassion is necessarily imbued with social power imbalance; and whether compassion can 
ever be made systematic (let alone institutional and administrative).7 
 
To explore the conceptual elasticity of compassion does not require endless quandary over definitions and 
definition-types. For example, we need not examine here whether “compassion” may be a “fuzzy 
concept” (Dietz and Moruzzi 2009; Haack 1996) or even an “essentially contested” one (Gallie 1956; 
Gray 1977); we need only accept that the concept is dynamic, evolving, manifold, and informed by 
competing conceptualizations and practices. “Compassion” is shaped by how we think and talk about our 
ideas, how and why we put them into practice, what results they produce, what we identify or deny as 
instantiations, and many other contextual factors. This rich fluidity presents great opportunity for 
“compassionate migration” to grow and produce social change, for what “compassionate migration” 
means will emerge not from academic debate but instead through interpersonal encounter, institutional 
practice, community-level action, and efforts at major policy reform in (inter)national settings. 
 
In light of the preceding discussion, it is necessary and useful to unpack compassion as apart from the 
law, policy, and practice considerations that occur elsewhere in the volume. Doing so also means talking 
briefly of the conceptual relationship among “compassion,” “sympathy,” and “empathy”—three words 
sometimes used interchangeably but which have distinct etymological and discursive histories as well as 
shifting meanings as connected to specific phenomena. The point here again is to make transparent how 
these notions may bear on the development of “compassionate migration” and vice versa. 
 
Compassion is a moral and social concept, although moral and social theorists do not necessarily agree 
over its description. For example, His Holiness the Dalai Lama (1999) posits a universal human potential 
or capacity to develop and enhance “genuine compassion.” Karen Armstrong’s “Charter for Compassion” 
(2009) and the organization that works under that name begin with the following statement: “the principle 
of compassion lies at the heart of all religious, ethical and spiritual traditions.” Judaism treats compassion 
as a virtue of intimacy and tenderness identified both with God and maternity (e.g., the Hebraic word 
rahamim means “the quintessential feeling of a mother for her child”), and which is to be practiced 
toward humans and animals alike (Brodye 2011, 181). Martha Nussbaum calls compassion “the basic 
social emotion,” but like these other theorists suggests that compassion may not even be a moral 
sentiment, strictly speaking. Nussbaum questions whether to act compassionately necessarily entails 
emotional response, let alone a particular one. She also points out that compassion involves a certain 
mode of reason or judgment as well as individual-community connections, and calls it “a bridge to 
justice” (Nussbaum 1996, 28–37). Importantly, these divergent accounts recognize that while compassion 
might be fundamental to the human condition, human beings are only ever imperfectly compassionate. 
 
Contemporarily, “compassion” is associated with causes and issues (such as the welfare of children and 
animals, and the provision of community services to underserved populations) and with other norms (such 
as communitarianism, ethics of care, contractarianism, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism). While 
such meanings and applications may differ from those of “compassionate conservatism” for instance, it is 
not the case that one orientation is compassionate while the other is not. Rather, these notions of 
compassion, as well as their application, mean different things.  
 
Attitudinal and practical varieties of compassion exist, and such varieties may indicate or ultimately help 
produce overlaps across compassion orientations that are useful to the aims of “compassionate 
migration.” After all, even a narrowly drawn social contract is in some measure compassionate and just 
toward those whom it includes (if also harsh and discriminatory against those it excludes). Types of 
compassion can be parsed according to factors like intent or motivation, target, action, agency of giver 
and receiver, appropriateness, and result (Saffire 2001).8 Such recognitions, and room for critical thinking 
and productive disagreement in light of them, will assist the larger aims of building mutuality and social 
cohesion that must be at the heart of “compassionate migration” if this practical notion is to succeed in 
resolving conflicts toward improving lives and transforming community. 
 
Few orientations to compassion contemplate universality; most focus on reinforcing intimacy, affiliation, 
or belonging. Furthermore, the extension of compassion is empirically finite and can produce 
“compassion fatigue,” even as compassion is renewable and generative (i.e., able to spark reciprocal or 
asymmetrical gestures and practices). Insofar as compassion expresses moral though not necessarily 
physical proximity, it may pass between strangers and members of different social groups, not just 
familiars and social equals. Compassion thereby allows for at least temporary crossings into and out of 
particular lives, communities, and circumstances, sometimes also for the development of durable caring 
relationships, justice commitments, and other bonds across various distances. In these and other ways, we 
can talk of social compassion and compassion as specifically oriented toward morally-driven social 
change, among the other manifestations and meanings of this concept. 
 
Etymology and Evolving Pragmatics 
 
Etymological work further reveals the conceptual elasticity of compassion, as some meanings have 
emerged and evolved while others have declined and become obsolete. Attention to this work, along with 
pertinent lexical definitions, holds heuristic and practical value for the aims of “compassionate 
migration.” For beyond assisting efforts to explore moral, political, and legal salience, attending to 
etymological roots and discursive factors reminds of the possibility of conscientiously developing and 
operationalizing new meanings, and likewise of working effectively with variant and competing 
orientations. 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “compassion” as “the feeling or emotion, when a person is moved 
by the suffering or distress of another, and by the desire to relieve it; pity that inclines one to spare or to 
succour.” Besides seeing how this lexical definition diverges from the preceding theoretical accounts of 
compassion, it is worth noting this: while the English word “compassion” derives from Middle English, 
Old French, and Late Latin (compassio = “sympathy,” from compati = “to suffer together with”), the 
Oxford Dictionary considers obsolete the specific meanings (“participation in suffering; fellow-feeling, 
sympathy”) most closely connected with those linguistic roots. 
 
Historically, it was “sympathy,” as coming from Greek and Latin roots, not “compassion,” that meant to 
have “fellow-feeling” and to “suffer together” (with a peer or beloved one). David Hume (1738), who 
developed a virtue-based, sentiment-driven account of ethics, identified “sympathy” as the human 
capacity for communication, especially with those to whom we are close or feel closeness. Hume’s (1748) 
skeptical critique of social contract theory notwithstanding, it was something like this kind of sympathy 
but as connected to the ideological development of egalitarianism that made possible the conceptual 
metaphors and practical applications of contractarian ethics. 
 
Like “sympathy,” the practical notion of “compassion” developed within conceptual frameworks and 
social contexts of reified privilege and institutional power. Unlike the intimacy and equality implied in the 
prior notion of “sympathy,” however, “compassion” described relations of distance and actions of 
condescension such as taking pity, displaying mercy, or giving charity. “Compassion” aimed toward 
amelioration (relief), not equalization (justice), and the “suffering with” that it involved has been 
identified with self-loving appreciation for good fortune (“there but for the grace of God go I”) (Saffire 
2001) rather than with standing in solidarity against suffering. Today, however, “compassion” and 
“sympathy” have largely flipped popular meanings; the latter is sometimes associated with distant 
condolence or actionless pitying. 
 
“Empathy,” as distinct from both “compassion” and “sympathy” (although arguably similar to Humean 
“sympathy”), is a relative notional newcomer. Titchener (1909), who is credited with coining the phrase, 
described “empathy” as a psychological phenomenon of being able to “feel one’s way into” or “to enter 
into the feelings of” another. Today, the notion of “empathy” encompasses attitudinal and volitional 
dimensions, too, insofar as it connotes personal experience of emotional response and connects with 
exercises of moral imagination. 
 
Recent interdisciplinary work seeks to enliven compassion as a conscientious force for social change. 
This account posits a triadic connection between a virtuous habit or committed practice of compassion 
and more basic emotional and cognitive capacities; each of which can be enlarged and refocused. 
Roughly stated, their conceptual relationship is this: an inability to bear the sight of the other’s suffering 
and feeling impelled to address it (empathy); examining one’s own relationship to the other and the 
suffering (moral imagination); and discerning and pursuing appropriate means of intervention for positive 
change (compassion). 
 
In practice, this kind of compassion is usually extended contextually (such as via prior relationship or 
affinity, coming into another’s immediate attention or thought, or seeking out common experience) when 
one is confronted with the other’s predicament. In such cases, empathy and moral imagination trigger 
when one faces another who is suffering or one has an opportunity to advance the other’s well-being.9 
Like a Samaritan, one does not avoid entanglement or shy away from the other. Yet compassion may also 
arise through merely contemplating how one, or a group or institution, can address these other-regarding 
interests in some appropriate way.10 One may act like a neighbor or friend, with generosity and 
fellowship, where one can provide aid according to what the other needs to thrive on. One might act even 
more intimately and with greater affection, or less passionately but with no lesser commitment to 
addressing suffering and promoting well-being, too. In each case, empathy and moral imagination provide 
awareness of basic equality, interconnectedness, and mutuality of interest, while compassion strives for 
their actualization. The other may be human or non-human, individual or group, and the suffering may be 
natural or (much more often) human-caused. Basic equality arises from shared capacities to flourish and 
likewise to suffer. Concern for the other’s well-being and (or) suffering as connected to one’s own 
reflects interconnectedness and mutuality. 
 
Put concretely: one may feel distressed over the other’s plight, ashamed over realization of one’s 
complicity in it or inaction against it, joyous in new friendships and solidarity for social justice, 
celebratory about successful struggle, and gratified from helping the other and improving one’s 
community. None of this involves imposing rather than helping, falsely identifying with the other, co-
opting the other’s experience, trumping the other’s interests with one’s own agenda, or turning an 
occasion for compassion into an opportunity for self-satisfaction (such as assuaging feelings of guilt). 
 
Compassion thus understood connotes the power of moral agency: doing something to improve the 
other’s condition and thereby one’s own according to the other’s interests, which also means doing 
something with the other to improve a shared condition and achieve a shared interest. Because of this 
humane intention, compassion tends toward leveling, inclusion, and transformation and it is appropriate 
to speak of mutual interests (such as in full participation, social cohesion, economic dynamism, social 
capital acquisition, and public health). The power of compassionate action so understood does not 
connote power differentials found in the etymological roots of “compassion” as previously discussed; it is 
arguably closer to older notions of “sympathy.” This kind of compassionate action uses social power 
morally and moral power socially for equalization and community. Furthermore, the privileged can, and 
often do, find themselves recipients of compassion from those who are less powerful, even from abject 
others. 
 
Connections, Caveats, and Consequences for “Compassionate Migration” 
 
This contemporary notion of compassion, in a triadic relationship with empathy and moral imagination, 
would provide justification and practical support for “compassionate migration.” It aligns, for example, 
with Armstrong’s “Charter for Compassion” and its associated International Campaign for 
Compassionate Communities, His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s teachings on compassion, and Pope 
Francis’s worldwide advocacy from the Holy See of compassion toward migrants (which His Holiness 
often directs toward secular governments) (Arrocha 2013–14). It may also be compatible with legal 
norms, such as those reflected in the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and other core human rights instruments, as considered 
in this volume. 
 
However, to paraphrase a previous recommendation made for strategic and conceptual reasons, the aim of 
“compassionate migration” should not be to reify this or any other account of compassion. Rather, we 
should engage, evaluate, and employ multiple accounts of compassion pragmatically, operationalizing 
convergence and productive disagreement toward key advances in the status and treatment of migrants 
and the transformation of political community. These advances include spreading compassion across 
noncitizen groups and throughout the body politic, expanding the scope of social compassion beyond the 
nation’s borders, and building a society that dwells in and radiates compassion (Bender 2011). If the 
overriding concerns are thus ones of efficacy, inclusiveness, and consensus rather than the polemics of 
discourse, it may make little difference whether efforts to advance “compassionate migration” identify 
with this, that, or any notion of “compassion” phrased as such. It may be pragmatic in some contexts to 
present ideas and practices through reference to cosmopolitanism or contractarianism (such as 
international human rights law). In others, appeals to nationalism or multiculturalism (“we are a nation of 
immigrants”), localism (“we are neighbors,” “we are a community”), or religious ideas (“we are all God’s 
children”) may best advance such social compassion. More to the point, and for most purposes, deeds will 
outweigh rhetoric. 
 
In Chapter 17 of this volume, Maurice Hamington discusses the issue of moral (or social) readiness to 
practice “compassionate migration.” It is a moot question whether the U.S. is ready, willing, and able, to 
employ a popular phrase here, because the sectors of civil society, the levels of government, and the 
people show varying degrees of preparedness. Far too many actors refuse to reject ready-made hatred and 
leave alone the tempting tools of enmification (Zur 1991). Where that is not the problem, other 
impediments like indifference, ignorance, benign neglect, and social inertia exist. 
 
Several chapters in this volume also consider what role law may play in changing this situation, and 
Hamington correctly notes that law cannot change directly how individuals and groups happen to think 
and feel. Surely positive law conveys thought and feeling, as well as force, as it attempts to influence the 
conduct and treatment of public actors and private ones too. Over time, official behavioral changes can 
encourage, even produce, meaningful attitudinal and social changes. The panoply of policies and 
organizations connected to positive law can gradually influence hearts and minds, too. The American civil 
rights legacy, in its grandest scope, illustrates how empathy and moral imagination, as part of struggle and 
solidarity, propel development of laws, policies, and regulatory organizations that instantiate social 
compassion and produce meaningful change, however elliptical and subject to regressive force such 
change may be. Yet the influence of positive law remains ambivalent, especially regarding immigrants 
and immigration. Over the past 15 years literally thousands of anti-immigration and immigration 
enforcement pieces of legislation were considered, and hundreds were enacted, at U.S. federal, state, and 
local levels. Some items never became law and others were reversed or struck down as unconstitutional, 
but the larger point is that while positive law (and its institutional arms and actors) might shape 
“compassionate migration,” this work cannot be left to positive law or its province. 
 
Subnational “Compassionate Migration” 
 
The topic of subnational “compassionate migration” warrants especially careful consideration. Saying 
nothing of the (inter)national significance of mass migration, its human dimensions and impacts are 
profoundly interpersonal and “local.” All people everywhere live daily in a local fashion—that is to say, 
in a place and in relation to its ambient circumstance. Even a solitary individual with few possessions, no 
long-term employment prospects, and no plans to settle is someone who nonetheless enters, exits, and 
otherwise navigates place-specific communities and their thick webs of intersubjective, inhabited 
relationships. Furthermore, migrants, like all people everywhere, are rarely such Hobbesian figures. 
Consider, for example, that the majority of unauthorized immigrants now living in the U.S. are women or 
children who traveled here from, or via, Mexico.  Most of whom have families on one or both sides of the 
border. All have cultures and languages, and many have family members and spiritual faiths, that 
accompany them wherever they go. Many have also experienced difficult-to-dire conditions back home, 
where they are now, and (or) somewhere in between. Just as importantly, all migrants have a variety of 
skills, what Nussbaum (1988, 1992) calls “capabilities,” and dreams. 
 
As Chapter 3 explains, the powers to set immigration policy and enforce immigration law are reserved to 
the federal government. However, the social treatment of noncitizens in daily life is a larger matter not 
exhausted by federal regulatory interest. Though the entire political community may remain unprepared 
for “compassionate migration,” and though social compassion toward the noncitizen other is inconsistent 
and unevenly practiced across the nation today, subnational actors can play influential roles and carry out 
important activities in immigrant policy (which includes alienage law and which thus connects to the 
federal regulatory interest in immigration policy). They can do this work on their own, together, and with 
the federal government. 
 
As Chapters 4 and 19 explore, some communities already practice “compassionate migration” on various 
scales, while others may become prepared to emulate or innovate such practices. Indeed, communities 
previously unprepared for “compassionate migration” can sometimes change quickly. They might also 
ground their compassionate efforts in appeals to local history, national ideals, and civic concerns, without 
reference to “compassion” discourses and branding that might not fit the context. 
 
The Hazleton Example: From Enmification to “Thanksmas” 
 
To concretize the analyses advanced in this chapter, consider the case of Hazleton, Pennsylvania and the 
work of the Hazleton Integration Project (HIP). Hazleton is a small, rural mining and manufacturing 
town, in previous generations populated by European immigrants (such as Italian, Polish, German, and 
Irish) and now a thriving, near-majority Hispanic community. Just one decade ago, Hazleton symbolized 
the local-level anti-immigrant movement then (and still) sweeping the nation. Like so many other 
communities, Hazleton experienced rapid demographic change for which it was not prepared and which 
its established, working-class white population did not necessarily welcome. In only a few years, 
Hazleton transformed from a predominantly white community into an area with a large Latina/o 
population (93 percent white, 2 percent Hispanic or Latino of any race in 2000; 69 percent white, 37 
percent Hispanic or Latino of any race in 2010). Hazleton had been mired in ongoing economic downturn, 
too, and the demographic shift and resultant social change provided opportunities for venting of 
frustrations and scapegoating. In 2006 and 2007, Hazleton’s city council adopted the punitively oriented 
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance (IIRAO) and Rental Registration Ordinance (RRO).11 Their 
provisions were emblematic of similar legislation produced from the 1990s through the early 2010s, and 
they inspired numerous copycats (O’Neil 2010; Khimm 2012; Gordon 2012a, 2012b). The Hazleton 
schemes were never enforced and were ultimately declared unconstitutional due to federal preemption 
(see Chapter 4). Besides losing several costly court battles extending over many years, the fractured 
community of Hazleton became a national symbol of anti-immigrant, anti-Latina/o enmification. 
 
Seeking to undo such damage and address underlying interests in social cohesion and community 
development, several individuals and organizations partnered to form HIP, which in turn led to the 
creation of the Hazleton One Community Center. HIP is the brainchild of its Honorary Chair, Joe 
Maddon, a Hazleton native and manager of Major League Baseball’s Chicago Cubs. Before leading the 
Cubs, Maddon lived many years in South Florida when he managed the Tampa Bay Rays, and in 
Southern California when with the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim. These contexts provided him direct, 
daily experience of living and working in highly diverse, significantly Latina/o communities and 
organizations. Maddon brought this mind-set back to Hazleton to help it repair its tarnished image and 
build a shared future. Of the rationale, promise, and vision for Hazleton Integration, he writes: 
 
We are a country of different cultures that have grown into one. That has always been the 
American way, and it’s our greatest strength as a nation. The Hispanic population is just 
the newest group of immigrants to arrive, and they can help reinvigorate the community, 
increase business development and spur growth that is presently lacking…With all of us 
pulling in the same direction, I know we will transform our city into a vibrant, active 
community once again that will make us all proud. (Maddon n.d.) 
 
Today, HIP and the Hazleton One Center combine immigrant integration and community service through 
low-cost or no-cost programs and classes focused on youth and families in the areas of health, education, 
sports/recreation, language acquisition, and cultural enrichment. HIP and the Center specifically aim to 
“foster trust and respect among all the region’s ethnic cultures,” such as through cultural discussions, 
cooking instruction, and classes taught in both Spanish and English. 
 
One such activity is Hazleton’s celebration of “Thanksmas,” named for the holiday that Maddon 
invented; “Thanksmas” is annually observed sometime between Thanksgiving and mid-January. A decade 
ago, Maddon developed a program through which he and other Tampa Bay Rays employees shopped for, 
cooked, delivered, and served “Thanksmas” dinners at homeless shelters throughout South Florida. 
Maddon prepares dishes from family Italian and Polish recipes (such as spaghetti and meatballs and 
pierogis) alongside other culinary fare (like jerk chicken and roasted pork). While Maddon would love to 
see “Thanksmas” become a national effort, perhaps the most important “Thanksmas” celebration happens 
in Hazleton. Since 2011, a late-December “Thanksmas” meal at Hazleton One caps several days of 
fundraising and community events organized or hosted by Maddon. The dinner, which is free to low-
income individuals and families, is sometimes followed by a free community screening of It’s a 
Wonderful Life (Capra 1946) shown with Spanish subtitles (Christman 2011). Watching this classic 
holiday film together provides a shared experience of an important American tradition. The film’s story 
reminds us how much any individual affects the life of a community (and vice versa) and likewise of the 
importance of coming together in good times and bad. As for Maddon, he has emerged as a national 
spokesperson for immigrant integration and local strategies to build social compassion. It seems fair to 
say that Maddon was no longer able to bear the sight of how his hometown, other cities, and newcomer 
and established populations alike were suffering. He has utilized his particular social and moral power to 
address that suffering and promote well-being, thereby also addressing his interests in the same. 
 
The messages and methods of the HIP/“Thanksmas” example emphasize solidarity, equity, conflict 
resolution, and social capital acquisition for the good of Hazleton and its people over time. Key to this 
model of social compassion is the embrace of both shared and diverse values, identities, and 
experiences—including of Hazleton as a community that has always had working-class immigrant roots 
and a shared passion for the American Dream. These efforts do not amount to a panacea and cannot 
resolve all of Hazleton’s challenges, and they may not fit everywhere that “compassionate migration” 
matters. However, they do have impact in building empathy and moral imagination, as well as community 
empowerment through social compassion, both where these efforts have taken place and where their 




Rather than recap this chapter, the concluding remarks seek to spark further conversation on developing 
“compassionate migration” as a practical notion. To that end, here are two provisional recommendations. 
The first is to work from the assumption that all people—as individuals and groups, and through 
organizations—can choose to become more compassionate, or differently so, by cultivating emotional-
cognitive precedents of compassion. Thus, it is also always possible to widen the scope of social 
compassion (such as regarding specific causes, values, and constituencies). Though this may be 
challenging work, we can learn to identify and eventually overcome attitudes, activities, rationales, and 
institutions that delimit compassion or narrow its scope. Such struggle is crucially important in previously 
less-compassionate contexts and toward continually growing compassionate communities and combatting 
enmification. The second recommendation is that “compassionate migration” may be best approached 
with a sense of stewardship, not stipulation. The meanings of “compassionate migration” will be 
deciphered through contextual answers to its core questions and concerns, and its success as a practical 
notion and social movement will depend upon how well it encourages others to discuss it, deliberate over 
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1 The total number of unauthorized migrants declined slightly between 2009 (11.3 million) and 2014 (11.1 million). 
The number of unauthorized migrants from Mexico declined from 6.3 million (2009) to 5.8 million (2014) while the 
numbers from Central America, Africa, and Asia increased. Thirteen states saw major demographic shifts, and 
Mexico remains the leading country of birth for unauthorized migrations nationwide (52 percent) and in at least 38 
states. 
2 By “enmification,” I mean consistent psychological and semiotic processes of creating an enemy, against which to 
delineate, organize, and mobilize opposition—“them” against “us,” “us” against “them.” Important to these 
processes are the identification, construction, and demonization of an “other” who inspires righteous hatred; the 
“other” is an enemy, and hated, precisely because “their” conduct and character expresses enmity toward “ours.” 
Immigration in general, and specific immigrant groups in particular, provide easy fodder for enmification, and 
opposition to the noncitizen “other” becomes ideological. “They” are cast as “outsiders” unwilling or unable to 
become like “us,” and they” stand for, or tolerate, what “we” rightly reject and oppose. “They” are depicted as 
fearsome and loathsome for taking what “we” have created and destroying what “we” hold dear. The obligation to 
oppose such an existential threat takes on moral, civic, and sometimes religious significance, as conveyed and 
carried out through words, images, actions, and policies. The path of Trump’s rise to political prominence illustrates 
the sociopolitical utility and multifaceted cultural reliance on enmification. Trump parlayed his name recognition, 
media savvy (especially in gaining headlines and manipulating the conventions of “reality TV”), and willingness to 
espouse hateful and inflammatory rhetoric. 
3 Trump stoked the animus behind anti-immigrant activism as useful to his political purposes, which included 
eliminating fellow Republican contenders Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio—two younger, more conservative, currently 
serving U.S. Senators who are the children of Cuban-American immigrants, each of whom has had a complicated 
relationship to “compassionate conservatism” (Mencimer 2011; Zengerle 2015; Silver 2016). 
4 Berlant (2004, p. 11) characterizes “compassionate conservatism” as a “social referent posited against the 
traditional (liberal) association of compassion with personal and state practices of recognition and redistribution,” 
well-articulated by contemporary figures such as John Rawls (1971, 1993) and Martha Nussbaum (1996), that 
remains generally in want of a liberally oriented “book length study of compassionate conservatism as theory and 
practice.” “Compassionate conservatism” and the “compassionate conservative” have been used as ideological 
visions, policy orientations, branding strategies, social justice critique, and honorific phrases. Although Marvin 
Olasky is known as “the godfather of compassionate conservatism” (Grann 1999, Weisberg 2008), historian 
Douglas Wead may have coined the term “compassionate conservative,” in a speech by the same name at the 1979 
Washington Charity Dinner; Wead later became an advisor to the Reagan Administration. In 1981, National Urban 
League President Vernon Jordan chided that Administration for “its failure to exhibit a compassionate conservatism 
that adapts itself to the realities of a society ridden by class and race distinction.” By the early- to mid-1980s, some 
members of Congress extolled “compassionate conservatism” as a conscientious policy orientation of meeting social 
welfare obligations while maintaining fiscal conservatism. 
5 These include a need to draw voters, rhetoric, and ideas away from Hillary Clinton and her campaign vow to enact 
“comprehensive immigration reform;” a wish to project the image of a wise political leader who can temper 
authority with compassion; and a fantasy of holding political subjects in thrall to the cult of personality of a 
“merciful” and “generous” autocrat. 
6 When President Barack Obama introduced Sonia Sotomayor, then a member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
2nd Circuit, as his nominee for Supreme Court Justice, he mentioned several traits he thought were important 
qualities of a Justice, including “experience,” “rigorous intellect,” and “recognition of the limits of the judicial role.” 
In speaking of experience, the President included life experience: “Experience being tested by obstacles and barriers, 
by hardship and misfortune; experience insisting, persisting, and ultimately overcoming those barriers. It is 
experience that can give a person a common touch and a sense of compassion.” President Obama then praised 
Sotomayor for “compassion and empathy.” Pundits seized on these remarks and the facts that the nominee was a 
relatively young woman of color with a short professional record; they voiced suspicion that Sotomayor would let 
emotion and identity politics taint her judgment and interfere with performance of her judicial role. During the 
Senate Confirmation hearings, Sotomayor distanced herself from President Obama’s remarks, saying “Judges can’t 
rely on what’s in their heart” (Cushman 2009). 
7 Garber (2004, p. 25) concludes that “Compassion seems to waver politically between two forms of inequality: The 
benevolence of those who have (the power of the rich) and the entitlement of those who need (the power of the 
poor). The insoluble problem for society—and for government and law—is to behave as if there were no 
competition between the two. And in some quarters, at least, ‘compassionate government’ is regarded as either a 
contradiction in terms or a category mistake. Compassion, it appears, is a good campaign slogan but not necessarily 
a winning political strategy.” 
8 In his dissent to PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001), U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia wrote 
“In my view today’s opinion exercises a benevolent compassion that the law does not place it within our power to 
impose” (emphasis added). In subsequent correspondence, Scalia asserted that the phrase “benevolent compassion” 
is not necessarily redundant, and clarified that “benevolent” was chosen as his means of “stressing the social-
outreach, maternalistic, goo-goo character of the court’s compassion” in Martin. Scalia also suggested that 
“compassion” might be differentiated according to whether it was motivated by benevolence (suffering with the 
other) or by self-love (despairing of facing similar misfortune). 
9 Empathy here does not necessarily mean the literal entry into the other’s situation, as both older notions of 
“sympathy” and “compassion” had done, nor does it mean actually feeling the other’s suffering or even necessarily 
feeling suffering (or any particular emotion) along with the other. Rather, empathy enlarged via moral imagination 
brings recognition that one’s own lot may be affected by and implicated in the other’s experience. This process need 
not, and perhaps should not, also involve trying to imagine experiencing what the other experiences or having 
similar qualitative feelings as the other has (Nussbaum 1996, p. 35). 
10 Woodward (2004) argues that for compassion to be effective, it must recognize its non-universality, with each 
case addressed contextually. 
11 The IIRAO and RRO imposed fines on employers for hiring unauthorized migrants and landlords for renting 
housing to them. They also imposed similar sanctions for those who contracted with unauthorized migrants, and 
required the use of English in conducting municipal government services. 
